

## Reflection of Deobandi Religious Education for Multicultural Education in Indonesia

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**Abstract:** Since the last USA troop is withdrawal from Afghanistan July 2021, there is new era of people Afghanistan. People of Afghanistan now under Taliban army as their start to take over all over the city in Afghanistan. At the turn of the twenty-first century, grant and arrangement talk about on Islam and Muslim social orders has come to center basically on Islam's capacity to form youthful Muslim's float towards anti-modernity developments. Numerous quality Islamic militancy, as well as the common socio-economic and political stagnation experienced in a few Muslim social orders, to Islamic religious or legitimate directs. However Islamic insightful convention is exceedingly pluralistic, and today's driving Islamic specialist structures are creating competing conceptual and methodological approaches which shift incredibly in their capacity to lock in with societal alter. Established as a grassroots movement for religious education in the wake of the 1857 Sepoy Rebellion in India, the Deoband 'ulama continue to flourish and to carry the mantle of "custodians of change" with increasingly activist vigor. What are the repercussions of this growth, and how does this contribute to an understanding of the complex interrelation of Sufism, pluralism, and democracy? Could we reflecting the Deobandi religious education to perform new era of Taliban in Afghanistan who tolerate economic development, multicultural, freedom religion, and women right in the context of multicultural education in Indonesia? This research analyzes concerns related to religious extremism in Afghanistan and prospect of possible actions for countering the threat. Education performed a critical role in the nation's building as it fills the gap between information and knowledge. It takes shortfall of information among the different divisions of a nation state.

**Contrbution:** The article "Reflection of Deobandi Religious Education for Multicultural Education in Indonesia" examines the Deobandi movement's impact on religious education and its relevance to Indonesia's multicultural society. It explores how Deobandi principles, emphasizing religious conservatism and anti-Western sentiment, can be reframed to contribute positively to Indonesia's multicultural education system. The research advocates for integrating Deobandi religious teachings into a broader educational framework that promotes understanding and respect for religious diversity, aligning with Indonesia's diverse cultural and religious landscape.

**Keyword:** Deobandi; religious education; multicultural education; Indonesia

## INTRODUCTION

The Deobandi school of Islam was founded in the latter half of the 19th century. It was part of a series of revivalist activities that were sweeping British India during the time. After the 1857 revolt against the British colonialists, Muslims in British India were the primary targets during the ensuing British attack because the revolt was fought under the leadership of the Muslim Mughal emperor. As part of the attack, the British occupied religious sites in Delhi, the capital of the Mughal Empire for several centuries. Muslim clerics in Delhi liked the patronage of the Mughals, but this shifted once the British occupied the city. The last Mughal emperor was exiled to Rangoon, Burma, and the British conquered the mosques in Delhi. This triggered many ulama (religious clerics) to migrate to various locations, such as the northern Indian town of Deoband, to sustain their religious life and culture. Deoband was a natural choice because it was a center of Muslim culture, and many families from Deoband had served in the Mughal Empire. Moreover, it was only 90 miles away from the former Mughal capital of Delhi. In 1867, Darul Uloom was established in the town of Deoband as one of the first major seminaries to impart training in Deobandi Islam. In addition to being close to other Muslim cultural centers in northern India, the founders of Darul Uloom assumed that the decision to establish the seminary had divine authorization. The name of the movement derives from town of Deoband in India where the first spiritual seminary of this group "Darul Uloom Deoband" was founded in 1867.<sup>1</sup> By 1967, Darul Uloom had graduated 3,795 students from present-day India, 3,191 from Pakistan and present-day Bangladesh, and 431 from multiple other countries, such as Afghanistan, China, and Malaysia. By 1967, there were 8,934 Deobandi schools worldwide. The majority of Madaris are not militant, but they are fundamentalist Deobandi. As of 2008, there were over 11,700 Madaris reported by the five wafaqs (Islamic seminaries) of

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<sup>1</sup> Shah, Syed Subtian Hussain. (2018) "Religious education and extremism in Pakistan: from Deobandi militancy to a rising sufi fanaticism". *Journal of Education Culture and Society* 9, no. 1 (June 27, 2018): 11-26. Accessed January 23, 2022.  
<https://jecs.pl/index.php/jecs/article/view/10.15503jecs20181.11.26>.

Pakistan By 2011, the number had grown to 19,366 Madaris with approximately 65 percent (over 12,500) of them being from the Hanafi-fundamentalist Deobandi subsect.<sup>2</sup>

When the school was founded, Deobandi scholars were cognizant of the religious diversity within India, and they tried to engage in dialogue with India's non-Muslim population. In 1875 and 1876, for example, Deobandi scholars participated in religious debates with Christian and Hindu scholars.<sup>6</sup> They jointly fought with non-Muslims against the British during India's colonial resistance, and they also participated in non-violent struggles against colonial rule. Even the town of Deoband itself is located in Saharanpur district of Uttar Pradesh, where Hindus form 62.7% of the total population of approximately 452,000 people.<sup>3</sup>(Puri, 2009) Moreover, during the initial period of Darul Uloom's establishment, Hindus reportedly contributed to its operating expenses.

The Deobandi movement became the most popular school of Islamic thought among Pashtuns living on both sides of the Durand Line. Many prominent Pashtun community leaders established Deobandi seminaries in these areas. Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, a prominent Pashtun leader, was instrumental in establishing several schools based on Deobandi curriculum in the Pashtun belt. In other parts of British India, however, they faced competition from other Islamic schools, primarily Barelvi Islam. Barelvi Islam, for example, remains the most popular Islamic school in what is now Pakistan's Punjab Province.

As in other South Asian schools of Islam, such as Barelvi and Ahl-e-Hadith, Deobandi places particular emphasis on the importance of religious education. It is committed to a "correct" interpretation of Shari'a (Islamic law). Deobandi students become alim (religious scholars) after an eight-year-long course in various aspects of Islamic learning such as logic, Islamic jurisprudence, the Qur'an, the history of literature and the hadiths. Deobandi scholars are opposed to certain Barelvi practices, such as visiting the tombs of saints. Their opposition to these practices, however, is not as rigid when compared to Ahl-e-Hadith, which follows a narrower interpretation of Islam. In that respect, Ahl-e-Hadith is like Saudi

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<sup>2</sup> Templin, James D. (2015), "Religious Education of Pakistan's Deobandi Madaris and Radicalisation." *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 7, no. 5. 15-21.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/26351354>.

<sup>3</sup> Puri, 2009.

Wahhabism, although it remains of South Asian origin. Darul Ulem Deoband Movement was reproduced by the Muslim religious scholars as response to British imperialism in Indian and its modernization. It aimed at persevering the culture and religious traditions of South Asian Muslims.<sup>4</sup>

The Deoband movement is now one of the most significant elements of Sunni Islam in the world. The loosely affiliated grassroots network of schools has become synonymous with traditionalist resurgence and resistance to Western cultural dominance and its accompanying knowledge economy. Metcalf's study of the school's 1866 inception has stimulated continuous academic interest, and this has been strengthened by more recent work like those of Zaman and Ingran. Although formal adherence to Suf tariqa-s has decreased among the Ahle Sunnah wal jamat, both the Deobandi and Bareilvi schools carry further the central elements of tasawwuf and the underlying theological assumptions. In this light, the Deobandi continue to thrive as post-tariqa expressions of Suf Islam: they are Sufs reforming Sufism.<sup>5</sup>

The story of the Taliban begins with the madrasas of western Pakistan and the interference of foreign powers in the affairs of South Asia. The dominant Sunni school of law in South Asia is the Hanafi *maddhab*. This would suggest that the Sunni Muslims of Pakistan and their institutions of religious learning are also associated with the Maturidite school of theology, or at least its creedal manifestation. That would include the Sunni Muslims of the modern reform indeed Deobandi madrasa movement. But the turbulent events of the last forty years dramatically changed the religious landscape of the region and displaced the normative Hanafi Sunnism that had been dominant there for centuries.<sup>6</sup>

Since the Taliban rolled into Kabul on September 26, 1996, Western media have grappled with the question of the nature of Islamic radicalism and its relation to religious

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<sup>4</sup> Muhammad Naveed Akhtar, Abul Rasheed, Muhammad Rizwan. Modernity and Islam in South-Asia: Approach of Darul Ulem Deoband Movement. *Journal of Academic Research for Humanities (JARH)* Vol. 2, No. 1 (2020) <https://www.jarh.lms.net.au/index.php/jarh>

<sup>5</sup> Ramsey, 2004.

<sup>6</sup> Halverson J.R. (2010) *The Taliban and the Maturidite School. In: Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. [https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230106581\\_6](https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230106581_6)

education.<sup>7</sup> One recent development in the Islamic world which has caught the eye of Western reporters is the increasing prominence of institutions of religious education, usually known as madrasas, particularly in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but also in India, Egypt, and indeed throughout the Islamic world. Journalistic attention to this topic has been remarkable. A Lexis-Nexis search of newspaper reports for the year following September 11, 2001, reveals hundreds of separate articles devoted to the new madrasas. These institutions, we are told, have spread like wildfire in the Muslim world, particularly in South Asia. Their rise is linked, inevitably, to the political movement known loosely as “Is-lamism,” and to the popularity of groups such as the Taliban and the emergence of new Muslim leaders such as Usama bin Ladin. It is not clear that these madrasas represent a uniform type. According to Hassan Madni, Director of Islamic Studies Department at Jamia al-Islamia in Lahore, The Taliban achieved power in Afghanistan through their individual struggle and enforced an ideal Islamic system there. Our religious scholars fully supported it. In contemporary Islamic history if we see Islam enforced anywhere and peace achieved it was in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime.<sup>8</sup> Deoband as a religious institution with a mission to promote knowledge of Qur'an, Hadith, and Islamic law, and the ‘ulama’ as “religious” scholars charged with cultivating public morality, are two sides of the same coin minted in the 19th century.<sup>9</sup>

## RESULT AND DISCUSSION

### Religious Education System

The Deoband movement is now one of the most significant strands of Sunni Islam in the world. The loosely affiliated grassroots network of schools has become synonymous with traditionalist resurgence and resistance to Western cultural dominance and its accompanying knowledge economy.<sup>10</sup> The word madrasa in Arabic simply means “school,”

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<sup>7</sup> Hefner, R. (2010). Chapter 1. *Introduction: The Culture, Politics, and Future of Muslim Education*. In R. Hefner & M. Zaman (Ed.), *Schooling Islam* (pp. 1-39). Princeton: Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400837458.1>

<sup>8</sup> Ramsey M. Charles. *Anti-Saint or Anti Shrine? Tracing Deoband's Disdain for the Sufi in Pakistan*. Sufi, Pluralism and Democracy. 16.

<sup>9</sup> Ingram, B. D. (2019). 'Modern' Madrasa: Deoband and Colonial Secularity. *Historical Social Research*, 44(3), 206-225. <https://doi.org/hsr.44.2019.3.206-225>

<sup>10</sup> Ramsey, 104.

and can be applied to a wide variety of institutions. The madrasas at issue here are schools, many of them independent of government control, that in some way have an explicitly Islamic character. Not infrequently, these institutions are caricatured as “medieval.” And indeed, the madrasa was one of the central institutions of religious life in much of the medieval Islamic world. There is no question of any direct institutional continuity between any of the contemporary madrasas and those which figured so prominently in medieval life. The great al-Azhar Mosque in Cairo is some-times spoken of as the oldest university in the world; unfortunately, for all its sentimental appeal, the assertion has little historical meaning. But in more general terms, to what extent can a historian of Islamic education recognize in these new schools’ institutions related to or descended from the medieval Islamic madrasa?

According to Pakistan’s Ministry of Religious Affairs, there are over 18,000 registered madrassas in the country, although the actual number of Islamic schools could be as high as 40,000. Madrassas are run on a strictly sectarian basis and, thanks to the inflow of Saudi funding in the 1980s, the network of Deobandi madrassas has expanded most speedily: in 2002, out of a registered total of 10,000 madrassas, 7,000 were Deobandi, 1,585 Bareilvi and 419 Shia. In 2002 the government launched a voluntary madrassa registration programmed that sought to improve the state’s oversight of madrassa curricula and activities, but according to the International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy, only 10% of previously unregistered madrassas have complied. Mushrooming madrassas intensify sectarian divisions by highlighting theological differences, denouncing the beliefs and practices of rival sects, and disseminating propaganda materials that fuel cycles of sectarian violence.<sup>11</sup> It is common to everyone that Pakistan was a source for the foreign sponsored Afghan Jihad and amount of the madrassas of the specific school of Islam speedily increased in Pakistan. It was the Afghan war, in which not only madrassa performed its role but also students of colleges and universities were not unconnected from the situation.<sup>12</sup>

The *madrassa*, that provided the ideological inspiration for the vast majority of

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<sup>11</sup> Yusuf Huma (2012) *Sectarian Violence: Pakistan’s Greatest Security Threat?* Noref Report. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 7.

<sup>12</sup> Shah, 17.

*madaris* in the Af-Pak border region later on, was established with two main goals in mind: a) to provide a more puritanical (and hence rigid) interpretation of Islam that would purge and protect Islam from any contemporary innovations; and b) to organize a religious education movement against British occupation. The puritanical *Deobandi's* were fiercely against all innovations and departures from orthodox Islamic beliefs. They also opposed any activity relating to a reinterpretation of the canon law (*ijtihad*) and considered the minority *Shi'a* Muslim community as heretical.<sup>13</sup>

Religious education in Afghanistan can be divided into the public i.e., government schools known as the 'official Madaris' (*rasmee Madaris*) and the private unregistered ones (*khusoosi Madaris*). Private Madaris in Afghanistan grew out of the traditional teaching circles (*halaqa*) that imparted religious education informally, via a network of teacher-student relationships. The first private Madaris in Afghanistan were thus institutions funded by affluent elders of society and operated without any government influence. The mainstream of private Madaris even today remain independent and unregistered with any government or private body in Afghanistan. The most common institutions of religious education in Afghanistan are the *Dar ul Hifaz*, like the *maktab* in Pakistan, where the students focus on memorization (*hifz*) and recitation (*tajwid*) of the Quran; and the Madaris, responsible for imparting Islamic knowledge via a religious syllabus at secondary and higher-level studies. Many Madaris also offer basic religious classes and Quran studies for younger students. Since then, the public administration of Islamic education in Afghanistan has been dealt with by the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Hajj and Endowment.

According to a Ministry of Education survey, there were some 336 Islamic schools in Afghanistan in 2007, accounting for only 1.54% of the total students studying in public and community-based schools, and not including private schools.<sup>14</sup> The curriculum in most Afghan Sunni Madaris is also based on the Dars-i-Nizami and affiliated with the Dar ul Uloom Deoband. However, Afghan Madaris still not have the formalized system of religious education that could award degrees and confer higher levels of recognized qualifications

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<sup>13</sup> Ashraf Sarah (2012). *Religious Education and Training Provided by Madrassas in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Boundary Area*. Art and Humanities Research Council. 9.

<sup>14</sup> Ashraf, 17.



upon their students. Afghan students seeking religious instruction travel to Pakistani Madaris due to a sequence of factors including the accessibility of higher-level religious degrees, the reputation and quality of educational institutions as well as access to well-reputed Islamic scholars. Some Afghan universities do offer the bachelor's degree in Islamic Studies; however, students need to go abroad for any higher degrees.

In addition, students from private Madaris find it challenging to obtain acceptance in Afghan universities if they wish to take the bachelor's degree and travel abroad for that reason. Formal degrees from known Pakistani Madaris such as Jamia Uloom Islamia Binori Town in Karachi and the Dar ul Uloom *Haqqaniya* are often recognized as a sign of quality amongst Afghan clergy.<sup>15</sup> Thus, the quality and prestige connected with well-reputed religious scholars and particular institutions remain the most significant factors accounting for the movement of Afghan students into Pakistani *Madaris*. These *madrassa* graduates then return to Afghanistan as teachers, religious leaders, scholars, judges, and even on occasion as recruits for militant groups operating in Afghanistan. The movement of people in the religious education segment is therefore mainly from Afghanistan to Pakistan and explains the infiltration of religious ideologies, curricula, and teaching methods from Pakistan into Afghanistan.

The anthropologist Olivier Roy calls such movements "neo-fundamentalist" to differentiate them from what can be seen as a different set of Islamic movements, often called "Islamist." Partial, as he puts it, to "mere implementation of the *shari'a*" in matters of ritual, dress, and behavior, "neo-fundamentalist" movements are distinguishable from Islamist parties primarily because, unlike them, they have neither a systematic ideology nor global political agenda. A more detailed label for them is, perhaps, "traditionalist" because of their continuity with earlier institutions, above all those associated with the seminaries and with the *'ulama* in general.<sup>16</sup>

Deobandi Theology from its inception the school at Deoband made a sharp distinction between 'revealed' or sacred knowledge, and 'human' or secular knowledge.

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<sup>15</sup> Kaja Borchgrevink. (2010). *Beyond Borders: Diversity and Transnational Links in Afghan Religious Education*. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 16.

<sup>16</sup> Metcalf D. Barbara. "Traditionalist" Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs. Social Science Research Council. <http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/metcalf.htm>. August 8 2021



The school excluded all learning that was not obviously Islamic by firmly rejecting other religious traditions (the Hinduism of India and the Christianity of the British missionaries) and forbidding Western style education and the study of any subjects not directly related to the study of the Quran. The school was also highly critical of Islam as it was practiced in the modern world, especially India. They felt the established religious order had made too many compromises with its foreign environment and therefore Islam needed to be purified of these foreign elements. To live out the pure Islamic tradition they embraced Taqlid (acceptance of the old interpretations) and rejected ijihad or reinterpretation of Islamic precepts to accommodate the changing times. It should also be noted that they are strict adherents to the Hanafi school of thought. This last point is critically important in understanding Deobandi (and by extension, Taliban) reasoning.

When putting the Hanafi legal code into practice two fundamental principles are always considered. First, the eventual outcome of an act must be considered before that act can be judged to be ethically permissible. For example, the fact that a woman does not cover herself completely in public may not be haram (forbidden). However, because it is likely to lead to a forbidden act, i.e., immorality, the activity is not permitted. The same can be said for women being treated by medical doctors or measured for clothes by a tailor. Medical examinations or proper fitting clothes are not forbidden. However, the fact that a doctor (or tailor) may entertain sexual thoughts while performing their duties makes this a forbidden practice. The second principle revolves around Ruskhah (what is permissible) and Azeemah (what is honorable). The practice states that what is honorable should take precedence over what is permissible. For example, it is “permissible” to take a life for a life but the “honorable” thing to do is to forgive.

In the Afghan context it is difficult to arrive at a consensus when using this principle because often ethnic and tribal norms become factors in deciding what is permissible and what is honorable. Thus, the above example would be true in an Indian context but because of long-held tribal beliefs the Taliban in Afghanistan reaches the opposite conclusion. In short, it is sometimes impossible to sort out what is ‘Islamic’ from what is ‘tribal’ in Afghan society. The Afghan Muslim response was to declare a jihad to cast out the infidel from their borders. Afghans were spirited fighters because they saw their cause as a holy

mandate. Madrassas produced young men who were primed to be fierce anti-Communist fighters. These new madrassas were financed in part by the U.S., Britain, and Saudi Arabia, as part of their humanitarian programs to increase the literacy level in Pakistan. It is no accident that these schools sprung up in Pakistan along the Afghanistan border. Young men streamed back and forth across the border to these institutions which provided the spiritual motivation to resist the Soviet threat. The madrassas indoctrinated its students with a love of Islam and a hatred for un-Islamic influences. It is important to note that military and/or terrorist training was not part of the madrassas' curriculum. This was conducted elsewhere in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Military training, however, was often pursued both during and after studying at a madrassa. For Afghans, involved in a jihad against an atheistic communist invader, it seemed that some form of military training was a natural and logical extension of the education that was received through the madrassa system.<sup>17</sup>

### **Reflection on Indonesia as Largest Muslim in the World.**

Indonesia is a country with a high diversity in various cultural background, ethnicity, language, and religion diverse. Thus, strategic approaches and instruments that can be utilized as a national movement to realize the national unity and integrity toward a sovereign and dignified nation are required. One of the instruments is multicultural education. Based on the field analysis, the diversity implementation of current multicultural education in Indonesia can be explained from several aspects: diversity in the concept dimensions, diversity in the meaning dimensions, diversity in the content dimension, diversity in the cultural dimensions, diversity in primordial dimensions, diversity in egocentric dimensions, and diversity in the religious dimension.<sup>18</sup>

Education is at the core of Islamic teachings leading the preachers of Islam, '*ulamā*', and Muslim rulers since the early history of Indonesian Islam to employ mosques and *langgar* as well as to adopt existing local institutions such as *surau*

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<sup>17</sup> Deobandi Islam. <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-deobandi.htm> August 17, 2021

<sup>18</sup> Suyahman (2016) *Implementation of Multicultural Education in Indonesia Between Expectations and Reality*. The 2nd International Conference on Science, Technology and Humanity. 207.

and *pesantren* or *pondok* as the places for Muslims to study Islam. A new momentum in the modernization of Islamic education in Indonesia has taken place in the last three decades at least. There are two historical courses that have been adopted: firstly, by fully integrating Islamic educational institutions into national education which are run and financed by the government and, secondly, by making standardization of Islamic education in accordance with national standards while the ownership and administration remain mostly in the hands of Muslim organizations and communities.<sup>19</sup> Religion, in the context of Indonesia, appears even more frequently than culture as one aspect of multicultural reality. Therefore, leaving out religion in the discussion of Indonesian multicultural education will have a consequence of missing out one of the central points of diversity in the country. In this context, multicultural education is also meant as education for religious diversity.<sup>20</sup>

Multicultural education is really conduct of care and understanding toward the politics of acknowledgment for the minority bunches. Within the setting, multicultural instruction perceives a wider public. Based on the fundamental see that the separation and non-recognition are not only rooted in racial awkwardness, but the worldview of multicultural instruction also incorporates the subjects of injustice, poverty, persecution, and backwardness of the minority bunches totally different places, social, culture, financial matters, instruction. Multicultural Education Concept based on al-Quran We need to muse some lessons said Allah through his messengers found in al-Quran. We need to optimize religion's role as integration and unifier factor. al-Quran, for the example, there are some verses which can be based to respect and reconsolidate between human beings, as stepping to do fair and wise in understanding the difference - al-Hujurot, verse: 13: "O mankind! Lo! We have created you male and female and have made you nations and tribes that ye may

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<sup>19</sup> Azra H. (2018) *Islamic Education in Indonesia*. In: Daun H., Arjmand R. (eds) *Handbook of Islamic Education*. International Handbooks of Religion and Education, vol 7. Springer, Cham. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64683-1\\_32](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64683-1_32).

<sup>20</sup> R. Raihani. "Education for multicultural citizens in Indonesia: policies and practices." *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education*, (2017). <https://doi.org/10.1080/03057925.2017.1399250>. 5.

know one another. Lo! The noblest of you, in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct. Lo! Allah is Knower, Aware.”<sup>21</sup>

As Taliban new era is start and make statement that they say there will be no revenge attacks on those who worked for the government or its security services, and that “life, property and honor” will be respected. They are urging Afghans to remain in the country and have pledged to create a “secure environment” for businesses, embassies, and foreign and local charities. the Taliban leadership says it is open to women’s education, but rights groups say the rules vary depending on local commanders and the communities themselves.<sup>22</sup> Reflecting from the complex development of Indonesian society and recent development of its interethnic and interreligious relations, multicultural instruction is imperative to nurture fitting and strong values to social and devout differences. In this study, we have appeared the political readiness of the Afghanistan government to create, though not as comprehensively as they ought to be, arrangements of multicultural education.

## CONCLUSION

Based on the reflections multicultural education implementation in Indonesia, we would like to give the conclusion for the new era of Taliban for education system. Religious leaders, community leaders, traditional authority, ought to make fatwa or religious law to support multicultural education, minorities, and women. They need to deal with the challenges of religious extremism and militancy; it should make truthful reforms in the religious education system by forming a permanent authority for supervising the system. The Government had better establish the assimilation of schools abstain from discriminatory treatment for any race, religion, and culture in all the present systems of private schools and colleges should be carried into line and equal to government system of education through a national education policy. The Government would promote the

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<sup>21</sup> Miftah Muhammad (2016) *Multicultural Education in the Diversity of National Cultures*. Qudus International Journal of Islamic Studies Volume 4, Issue 2, August 2016. 170.

<sup>22</sup> Faiez Rahim, Akhoar Tameem and Krauss Joseph (2021). *Taliban promises new era of peace as Afghan’s fear return to brutal rule*. Aug 15, 2021.  
<https://www.syracuse.com/news/2021/08/taliban-promises-new-era-of-peace-as-afghans-fear-return-to-brutal-rule.html>. August 18, 2021.

multicultural activities, to build economy of nations through Madrassa's system should be modernized and its curriculum should include modern and scientific education and the skillful students at the religious schools should be attuned in the mainstream through job market of the country.

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